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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dakota Lee Villafuerte appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to failing to register as a sex offender. Villafuerte contends 
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, in which Villafuerte 
claimed the state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for failing to register as a 
sex offender because, according to Villafuerte, his failure to update his address 
after he absconded was not a crime in Idaho. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2012, Villafuerte pied guilty to battery with intent to commit a serious 
felony (lewd conduct) and the court imposed a unified 15 year sentence, with 
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (See R., pp.37-38.) At the end of the 
retained jurisdiction period, the court placed Villafuerte on probation and 
Villafuerte registered as a sex offender as required by I.C. § 18-8304. (See R., 
p.38.) Villafuerte "listed his parent's home in Nampa, Idaho as his residence." 
(R., p.38.) 
In November 2013, after Villafuerte was ordered by his probation officer to 
serve discretionary jail time, Villafuerte did not report to the jail, or return to his 
registered address, but instead absconded to Nevada, and was later arrested in 
Utah. (R., pp.38-39, 47.) The state subsequently charged Villafuerte with failing 
to register as a sex offender for "fail[ing] to update his registration information 
within two working days as required by statute." (R., pp.8-9, 18-19, 35-36.) 
Villafuerte filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the "State of Idaho lacks jurisdiction 
1 
over the crime" because it was not a crime in Idaho for him to fail to provide a 
current address after he absconded to Nevada. (R., pp.37-42.) The district court 
denied Villafuerte's motion, after which Villafuerte entered a conditional guilty 
plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. (R., pp.54-70, 74-77.) 
The court imposed a unified six year sentence, with six months fixed, to run 
consecutive to a sentence imposed in a separate case. (R., pp.79-80.) 
Villafuerte filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.81-83.) 
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ISSUE 
Villafuerte states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Villafuerte's 
motion to dismiss this case because the State of Idaho did not have 
jurisdiction over the alleged criminal act. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Villafuerte failed to establish the State of Idaho lacks jurisdiction to 
prosecute him for a violation of I.C. § 18-8311 (failing to register as a sex 




Because Villafuerte Has Failed To Establish The State Lacks Jurisdiction To 
Prosecute Him For Failing To Comply With Idaho's Sex Offender Registration 
Requirements, He Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To 
Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Villafuerte claims the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, 
arguing, as he did below, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the alleged crime 
of failing to register as a sex offender. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-20.) Villafuerte's 
claim fails. Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of his case 
supports the district court's conclusion that the State of Idaho has jurisdiction to 
prosecute Villafuerte for failing to comply with Idaho's sex offender registration 
requirements. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 539 
(2012) (brackets, quotations, and citation omitted). "Jurisdiction is likewise a 
question of law and is reviewed de novo." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 
P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011) (citing State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 
1095, 1097 (1998)). 
C. The State Of Idaho Has Jurisdiction To Prosecute Villafuerte For Failing 
To Comply With Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Requirements 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting 
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Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007)). "Because the 
charging document is the instrument that confers subject matter jurisdiction on a 
court, whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction depends upon whether the 
charging document is legally sufficient." State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 
298,297 P.3d 257, 261 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009)). "An indictment or an information confers 
jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed a criminal offense within the 
state of Idaho." ~ 
The Amended Information alleges that Villafuerte violated I.C. § 18-8311 
along with other provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Notification and 
Community Right-to-Know Act ("SORA"). (R., pp.35-36.) Section 18-8311, I.C., 
provides, in relevant part: "An offender subject to registration who knowingly fails 
to register, verify his address, or provide any information or notice as required by 
this chapter shall be guilty of a felony." I.C. § 18-8311(1). Because the 
Amended Information alleges Villafuerte "committed a criminal offense within the 
state of Idaho," it is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Therefore, dismissal based 
on a jurisdictional defect would only be appropriate if "the facts alleged do not 
constitute a prosecutable act under the laws of the State." State v. Olin, 153 
Idaho 891, 894, 292 P.3d 282, 285 (Ct. App. 2012). Villafuerte contends such a 
defect exists because, he argues, the underlying facts do not support a criminal 
charge in Idaho because SORA does not impose upon him an obligation to 
update his address when he absconds and leaves the state. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.13-14.) Rather, Villafuerte asserts, "the criminal act - failing to register - may 
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have occurred in Nevada or Utah, but it certainly did not occur in Canyon 
County," Idaho. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14 (footnote omitted).) Villafuerte's 
interpretation of the statute and the applicable legal standards is incorrect. 
As noted, under I.C. § 18-8311 (1 ), it is a felony for an offender subject to 
SORA to knowingly "fail[ ] to register, verify his address, or provide any 
information or notice" required by SORA. In turn, I.C. § 18-8309(1) requires an 
offender subject to registration who changes his name, street address or actual 
address, or employment or student status, to "appear in person within (2) working 
days after the change at the office of the sheriff of the county where the offender 
is required to register and notify the sheriff of all changes in the information 
required." This notification requirement is satisfied if the offender appears "in 
another jurisdiction in which registration is required and notifies that jurisdiction of 
the changed information." I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). "Jurisdiction" for purposes of 
SORA includes any state. I.C. § 18-8303(9). Thus, changes in information that 
an offender is obligated to update under I.C. § 18-8309(1) must be reported to 
the county sheriff or to an official in another state, if that state requires 
registration, and the failure to do so is a felony, I.C. § 18-8311.1 That Villafuerte 
can satisfy the requirement to update his registration information in Idaho by 
registering in another state does not mean he is not guilty of violating I.C. § 18-
1 It is also a felony for an offender subject to the registration requirements of 
SORA to fail to "immediately notify the department[, i.e., the Idaho State Police], 
of any lodging lasting seven (7) days or more, regardless of whether the lodging 
would be considered a residence as defined in section 18-8303, Idaho Code." 
I.C. § 18-8309(2); I.C. § 18-8303(5) (defining "department" for purposes of 
SORA). It appears from the facts in the record, that Villafuerte violated this 
provision of SORA as well. 
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8311. To the contrary, if Villafuerte changes his address, he must notify either 
the county sheriff or, if his address is changed to another state, he must register 
there if registration is required. I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). Villafuerte's claim that such a 
conclusion would be inconsistent with "United States Supreme Court precedent" 
is without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
The United States Supreme Court cases on which Villafuerte relies are 
Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961), Johnston v. United States, 351 
U.S. 215 (1956), United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958), United States v. 
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699 (1946), and United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 
(1916). (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-14.) Villafuerte's reliance on these cases is 
misplaced because none of the cases discuss SORA much less interpret its 
jurisdictional boundaries. Rather, in all of these cases, the Court was interpreting 
a federal statute for purposes of determining venue, not jurisdiction. Travis, 364 
U.S. at 632-33 (only addressing whether venue was proper in Colorado for 
alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act); Johnston, 351 U.S. at 216 
("We must determine the proper venue for the trial" of violations of the Universal 
Military Training and Services Act.); Cores, 356 U.S. at 409 ("venue for s 252(c) 
[of the Immigration and Nationality Act] lies in any district where the crewman 
willfully remains after the permit expires"); Anderson, 328 U.S. at 699 ("On the 
merits the issue is narrow, namely, whether in a criminal prosecution under s 11 
of the Selective Training and Service Act, for refusal to submit to induction, the 
venue is properly laid in the judicial district where the act of refusal occurred 
rather than in the district where the draft board which issued the order is 
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located.") (code sections omitted); Lombardo, 241 U.S. at 76-78 (based on 
interpretation of the word "filed" as used in the "White Slave Traffic Act," Court 
found violations of act justiciable in District of Columbia where Commissioner 
General of Immigration was located). None of the Supreme Court's decisions 
determining the proper venue for prosecuting a violation of United States law, 
over which the United States Government has jurisdiction, has any bearing on 
whether the State of Idaho has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of an Idaho 
statute. Villafuerte's claim that "United States Supreme Court precedent" 
precludes his prosecution fails. 
Villafuerte also contends that Idaho law dictates a finding that there is no 
jurisdiction in Idaho over the charged offense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
Specifically, Villafuerte contends I.C. § 18-202 and I.C. § 19-301 provide that 
"Idaho courts only have authority to hear and impose punishment in (i.e., have 
jurisdiction over) cases involving acts occurring within the state," and "[t]he only 
way around this territorial limitation on jurisdiction is the so-called 'long-arm' 
statute," I.C. § 19-302. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) None of these statutes support 
Villafuerte's jurisdictional claim. 
First, I.C. § 19-301 governs venue. As the plain language of the statute 
indicates, "[v]enue is nonjurisdictional." I.C. § 19-301(2). Second, as previously 
noted, SORA requires Villafuerte to update the Idaho Sex Offender Registry 
when he changes his address, and he can accomplish this by appearing at the 
sheriff's office where he is required to register or by appearing in another state in 
which registration is required and notifying that state of the change. I.C. § 18-
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8309(1 ). The failure to update the Idaho Sex Offender Registry is a crime "within 
this state," which is all that is required by I.C. § 18-202. Accordingly, there is no 
need to determine whether the "so-called 'long-arm' statute," I.C. § 19-302, 
applies. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Even if this Court determines an analysis under 
I.C. § 19-302 is necessary, any such analysis supports a finding that Idaho has 
jurisdiction over Villafuerte's violation of I.C. § 18-311. 
Idaho Code Section 19-302 "allows a defendant to be liable for 
punishment within Idaho 'when the commission of a public offense, commenced 
without the state is consummated within its boundaries .... "' State v. Doyle, 121 
Idaho 911,913,828 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1992) (quoting I.C. § 19-302). Under this 
statute, "an Idaho court will have subject matter jurisdiction over a crime if any 
essential element of the crime, including the result, occurs within Idaho." Doyle, 
121 Idaho at 914,828 P.2d at 1319. In order to establish a violation of I.C. § 18-
8311, the state must prove (1) the defendant was subject to registration, and (2) 
he "knowingly fail[ed] to register, verify his address, or provide any information or 
provide any information or notice" as required by SORA. I.C. § 18-8311(1). 
SORA requires, among other things, a registered offender to update his address 
with either the county sheriff or another state if the other state requires 
registration. I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). At a minimum, the result of Villafuerte's failure to 
provide current information to any Idaho official, or to register in either Nevada or 
Utah, which Villafuerte admitted he did not do (R., p.48), occurs within Idaho 
because Idaho's Sex Offender Registry continues to list him as living at an 
incorrect address in Idaho, and Villafuerte cannot be removed from Idaho's Sex 
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Offender Registry "until [his] registration in another jurisdiction is complete." I.C. 
§ 18-8307(4)(a). It is Villafuerte's interpretation of the law that "ignores the plain 
language" of the applicable statutes, not the "district court's reading" that 
Villafuerte had "to notify either the jurisdiction to which [he] is moving or the 
jurisdiction from which [he] moved."2 (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
Finally, Villafuerte argues that "the district court's decision is at odds with 
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559[, 286 P.3d 
537] (2012)."3 (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) This is so, Villafuerte claims, because he 
believes the Court in Lee implicitly concluded that (1) a defendant's "only 
obligation" under SORA is to "report in the place of his new residence," assuming 
2 As part of his "plain language" argument, Villafuerte relies on the Court of 
Appeals' unpublished opinion in State v. Wilson, 2013 WL 5488655 (July 12, 
2013 Idaho App.), and asserts that although "[u]npublished opinions may not 
have precedential value, [] they are still persuasive as examples of a learned 
court's conclusion after evaluating the same or similar issues." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.17 and n.8.) The state fails to see a distinction between citing an unpublished 
opinion for "precedential value" and citing it as an "example of a learned court's 
conclusion" on "the same or similar issue[]." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 n.8.) 
Nevertheless, the issue in Wilson was whether there was sufficient evidence that 
Wilson violated SORA by failing to register annually in Idaho after he moved to 
Oregon. Wilson at *1-2. The Court of Appeals concluded the evidence was not 
sufficient because the applicable versions of the relevant statutes "relieved an 
offender of the duty to register annually in Idaho once the offender moved to 
another state." kl at *2. Because the state did not charge Villafuerte with failing 
to register annually after absconding from Idaho, Villafuerte's reliance on Wilson, 
even if proper despite the fact it is unpublished, is misplaced. 
3 Villafuerte also complains that the district court employed an incorrect rule of 
statutory interpretation by stating that Villafuerte's argument would lead to absurd 
results. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) While Villafuerte correctly notes that the Idaho 
Supreme Court has rejected the "absurd results" principle of statutory 
construction (Appellant's Brief, p.19), the district court's reference to such is 
ultimately irrelevant because both jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are 
questions of law reviewed de nova. Lee, 153 Idaho at 561, 286 P.3d at 539; Lute, 
150 Idaho at 839,252 P.3d at 1257. 
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that place has a registration requirement, and (2) a defendant has no "obligation 
to inform the jurisdiction he left." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Assuming these 
conclusions are implicit in Lee, which the state does not concede, they support a 
finding of jurisdiction.4 The first implicit conclusion, in particular, undermines 
Villafuerte's jurisdictional claim because that finding, according to Villafuerte, is 
that a registered sex offender has an obligation under SORA to "report in the 
place of his new residence" - because Villafuerte failed to do so, the state had 
jurisdiction to prosecute him pursuant to I.C. § 18-8311. Villafuerte has not 
demonstrated otherwise. 
Villafuerte has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss. 
4 The issue in Lee was whether the state presented sufficient evidence that Lee 
failed to register as required by I.C. § 18-8309. Lee, 153 Idaho at 561, 286 P.3d 
at 539. The Court concluded it did not because Lee moved to another country 
and "[n]owhere in [the applicable version of] I.C. § 18-8309(1) or (2) is the word 
'country' mentioned." lsL at 562, 286 P.3d at 540. If anything, the Court implicitly 
found that the evidence would have been sufficient if the state had shown that 
Lee established residence in another state before leaving the country. lsL 
("There was no evidence at trial as to how Lee left Idaho, whether it was by air or 
by land. Assuming that Lee traveled through one or more states before leaving 
the United States, he would not necessarily have had an address in any of those 
states. Therefore, there was no evidence that he changed his address to 
another state."). Further, under the version of the statute at issue in Lee, an 
offender who changed his address to another state was required to provide 
written notice to the department. lsL at 561-562, 286 P.3d at 539-540. 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Villafuerte's conditional guilty plea to failing to register. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of November, 2015, served 
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